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ABSTRACT 
 
I investigate whether timing of the elections impact economic globalization process or 
not in India. In other words, do elections slowdown economic globalization process? The 
theoretical underpinning is that, policies of economic globalization lead to economic and 
social hardships in short run but benefit the economy in the long run. The motto behind 
slowing down the economic globalization process before elections is that it leads to 
polarization of voters and thus negatively affects the incumbent government. I make use 
of Axel Dreher‘s economic globalization index and construct ‗instrumental electoral 
cycle‘ to capture the scheduled and midterm election cycle.  
 
Using time series data for India for the period 1970 – 2006, I find that scheduled 
elections are associated with slow down in economic globalization, whereas midterm 
elections are not. Replacing Dreher‘s economic globalization index with our modified 
globalization index does not alter the results. I also find that slow down in economic 
globalization process is responsive to the propinquity to a scheduled election year. 
Meaning, as incumbent government nears the scheduled elections, economic 
globalization process keeps slowing down, while this is exactly opposite during the early 
years of incumbent government in office. These results suggest that elections generate 
―electoral globalization cycle‖ in developing democratic country like India.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In electoral competition framework, there are different models which talk about the effect 
of elections on government behavior. The first such model, ‗political business cycle‘ was 
formulated by Nordhuas (1975) and Lindbeck (1976). They argue that politicians 
manipulate the economic policies during the election period, by higher spending to 
increase economic growth on one hand and on the other hand, the incumbent government 
aims to keep the unemployment under control, leading to business cycles. While, Rogoff 
& Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) advocates ‗budget cycles‘ by increasing the spending 
on consumption and reducing taxes before the elections to highlight that the incumbent is 
competent enough to deliver public services. Recently, Khemani (2004) developed the 
‗career concern‘ model in which she argues that pressure of elections will be higher on 
politicians to provide better public services and increase developmental spending and 
reducing non-developmental expenditure, highlighting that fiscal manipulation would be 
low and selective on some of the taxes and spendings which directly effect the people. 
All these studies deal with government policies with specific reference to fiscal policy. 
However, instead of looking at only fiscal policies, I probe the effect of union elections 
on economic globalization process in India. I undertake this investigation for two specific 
reasons: one, since the advent of neoliberal policies in early 1990s in India, there is a 
structural change in many of the government polices. There is a transformation from 
‗inward looking polices‘ towards ‗outward looking or liberalized policies‘. These are 
driven by economic globalization process, which inturn affects basic government policies 
like fiscal and monetary policies. Therefore, one can assume that economic globalization 
process as a derivative of governments various economic policies. Two, the evidence on 
the effects of economic globalization process on socioeconomic conditions is mixed and 
hence its implications on elections are unknown.  Thus, this study bridges this gap and 
addresses several questions: Does incumbent government manipulate the economic 
globalization polices just before the elections to avoid the defeat? Whether there exists 
‗electoral globalization cycle‘? Do midterm elections affect economic globalization 
process? And what are the policy implications that we can derive from the results?  
 
It is well proved fact that voters who are most hurt by the government policies which lead 
to strained economic situations are more likely to punish the incumbent governments  in 
the elections (Burdekin, 1988; Lewis-Beck, 1991; Gleisner, R. F, 1992; Çarko lu, 1997; 
Wilkin et al. 1997; Fielding, 1998 & 2000; Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000; Chappell & 
Veiga, 2000; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Youde, 2005; Nordhaus, 2006; Akarca & 
Tansel, 2006a & b; Duch & Stevenson, 2006; Mitchell & Willett, 2006 and Veiga & 
Veiga, 2006). Usually, voters relay more on the macroeconomic conditions of the country 
while voting (Lewis-Beck, 1988), though certain elections are found to be issue based 
elections. But in majority of the cases, it is the economic situation on the ground which 
matters the most and is the driving factor for the voters (Alvarez et al., 2000). These 
macroeconomic factors are inturn determined by the economic globalization policies 
initiated by the incumbent governments. There is empirical evidence to show that 
economic globalization policies lead to short term economic and social hardships, but 
provide economic benefits in the long run (Wolf, 1999 & Vadlamannati, 2008). Because 
the benefits of the economic globalization process tends to be isolated, but the costs 
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associated with it are strenuous in short run, those sections of the society who are worst 
hit by these policies would like to replace the incumbent government with those who are 
more likely to adapt policies which do not hurt the people. This forces the incumbent 
government to slowdown the economic globalization process as and when they near the 
scheduled election year. This would be the only option available with the government as 
it cannot completely reverse the economic globalization policies which were adopted 10 
to 15 years ago as reversal of these policies would prove very costly for the country. 
Hence, economic globalization polices would accelerated once the incumbent 
government gets back to the office post elections, thus creating ‗electoral globalization 
cycles‘. However, this is exactly opposite in the case of midterm elections. This is 
because the timing of midterm elections (which occur anytime after a previous election) 
is unanticipated and hence, it does not provide incumbent government the scope to 
manipulate and slowdown the economic globalization process.  
 
Why India? 
 
I selected India to conduct this study in the first place for several reasons. India happens 
to be world‘s second largest developing country with a profound history of stable 
democracy. The Constitution of India allows the elections commission to conduct both 
union and state legislative elections for every five year term. The union elections are 
conducted for Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament) once in five years. The 
participation in union and state elections in world‘s second largest democracy is quite 
high. The average turnout in Union elections in India is about 58.7% (Election 
Commission, 2004). India adopted the neoliberal economic policies in 1991 with a 
Structural Adjustment Program with World Bank. Moreover, India provides classic case 
of electoral globalization cycle as there were many instances where the incumbent 
government was forced to go slow on such policies as and when it neared the elections. 
In 1989 elections, the Congress government which introduced Economic Reforms 
Commission did not even initiate the reforms process despite enjoying full majority in the 
parliament. The Congress government after officially initiating neoliberal policies in 
1991 almost halted the process as it neared 1996 Lok Sabha elections. Same is the case 
with BJP led NDA government in 1996 and present Congress led UPA government. This 
is because, though economic globalization process gave excellent economic growth in 
long run, its real benefits are not reaching to the poor. Thus, many argue that India‘s 
economic growth and development process resulting from globalization policies is not 
inclusive of the poor (Gupta, 1999). This is evident by comparing the growth in GDP and 
Percapita GDP with the pace at which poverty and inequality levels are reduced. On one 
hand, the rate of growth of reduction in poverty and inequality levels has been very low 
during the last two decades (Dutta, 1991) and on the other hand, India witnessed rapid 
surge in economic growth, industrial and services growth, urbanization and FDI inflows, 
highlighting that the development process tends to be ‗exclusive‘. Therefore, India 
provides an excellent case study to examine the existence of ‗electoral globalization 
cycle‘.  
 
2. Election Cycles & Economic Globalization: Theoretical Underpinnings 
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The literature presents conflicting findings on the implications of economic globalization 
process on socioeconomic development. The Liberal theorists argue that countries which 
are highly engaged in globalization process are likely to experience higher economic 
growth, greater affluence, more democracy, and increasingly peaceful conditions in the 
home country and elsewhere (Flanagan & Fogelman, 1971; Weede, 1995; Jacobsen, 
1996). It is believed that globalization process is most likely to improving quality of life. 
It help promote economic development, providing trade and investment opportunities 
creating much needed employment generation and reduce income inequality and poverty 
thereby leading to decline in social unrest and economic insecurity. Thus, countries with 
higher levels of globalization process should suffer lesser degree of socioeconomic 
problems and have greater development. Higher globalization process also serves in 
attaining development goals for developing economies. 
 
On the contrary, skeptics contend that higher levels of globalization process tend to 
generate greater economic and social inequalities. This leads to greater economic 
insecurity and social unrest in the society. Sometimes it also paves way for the risk of 
political instability and outbreak of riots, agitations, protests, conflicts and disturbances 
thereby (Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Barbieri, 1996; Rodrik, 1997, Rodrik, 1998; Rodriguez 
& Rodrik, 2000, Blinder, 2006; Summers, 2006; Krugman, 2007). 
 
Taking both these perspectives into consideration evolves another set of group which take 
middle path arguing that globalization brings both good and harm. Their premise is 
largely based on the J-Curve model developed by Przeworski (1993) who advocated that 
reforms and globalization policies though beneficial for the country and society in the 
long run, they lead to economic and social hardships in the immediate short run. This 
theory argues that whatever might be the long-term implications of socioeconomic 
growth and high development, the immediate short term effect of economic globalization 
process is the structural adjustments in the economy which generates substantial 
economic and social costs in terms for increase in unemployment and inflation (Marer & 
Zecchini 1991), resource misallocation (Roland 1994), volatility in income distribution 
(Milanovic 1995), declining output (Kolodko 1999), and poor socioeconomic conditions 
(DeMelo, Denizer, & Gelb 1996). There are also other prominent studies like Wolf 
(1999) finds a significant J-curve relationship between neoliberal policies and economic 
growth and development. Similar such findings were apparent in the study related to 
reforms and globalization process and its impact on government repression by 
Vadlamannati & Soysa (2008). With specific focus on India, Vadlamannati (2008) finds 
similar such J-curve relationship between economic reforms and globalization with 
poverty levels, suggesting that economic globalization and internal reforms are associated 
with economic and social hardships in the short run, but are beneficial in long run
1
.  
 
To control these economic and social costs in short run, sometimes the government 
resorts to policies which can be detrimental to the sizeable sections of the society. For 
example, to curtail high inflationary pressures, on one hand, the government hikes tax 
rates and on the other hand it can also increase interest rates. Similarly, in the process of 
                     
1
 Similar such results are found by Vadlamannati & Irala (2008) for economic reforms and domestic private 
investments in India.  
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making the public sector efficient and improve the savings of public sector, government 
undertakes massive restructuring policies like privatization program which many times 
results in huge layoffs. To contain higher levels of fiscal deficits, the governments due to 
their coilation political compulsions resort is cutting the social sector development 
expenditure. Such hard policies interned for long-term benefits make a sizeable fraction 
of the population disaffected (Mygind 1999). Thus, the incumbent governments who 
implement these neoliberal policies face severe pressures from those groups and sections 
in the society which are widely affected by these liberalized economic policies. This 
creates short-run losers from economic globalization policies as the major opposers of 
government‘s neoliberal economic policies. Their main argument is that they do not 
believe the idea of the government which promises future gains and in return expecting 
political support to carry forward the neoliberal economic policies. Further, they believe 
that government often fails to keep the commitment which is made to the people during 
the previous elections that they would continue with the economic globalization polices 
until it yields benefits to the society in the long run
2
 (Slantchev, 2005). Moreover, Rodrik 
(1994) argues that the consequences of neoliberal policies often involve the redistribution 
of income among different groups. If the efficiency gains from those policies are not 
substantial and income is not redistributed properly, this leads to either evade or slowing 
down of those policies. Precisely this is the reason why whenever the new form of polices 
are designed and adopted, there would be wide spread agitation to resist making 
substantial policy changes which inturn affect the vast sections of the population. This 
sometimes leads to angry mob protests, conflicts, strikes and lockouts and riots forcing 
the governments to roll back or reverse the policy decisions (Fields, 2003). This also 
means that governments that are vulnerable to the reactions of certain sections of the 
society, which constitute significant portion, are less likely to carry forward the economic 
globalization process at a rapid pace and might engage in piece meal reform process.  
 
According to the electoral competition theories the opportunistic politicians resort to 
manipulate economic policies during election times for political gain. Thus keeping the 
country‘s long term economic benefits on stake by manipulating the economic policies to 
reduce short term political losses (avoiding loosing elections). Infact the ‗political 
business cycle‘ theory is propounded by Nordhaus (1975) and Lindbeck (1976) argue that 
usually the incumbent governments keep growth high and unemployment low just before 
elections. To gain from these manipulations, the incumbent governments bank on 
uninformed voters who can provide them short term benefits. This model finds support in 
many studies in literature specially related developing countries. Studying the case of 
eight Latin American countries, Ames (1987) finds evidence of increased public spending 
during election years. Schuknecht (1996) examines fiscal policies in a sample of 35 
developing countries from 1970 to 1992. He finds that while there is no election effect on 
                     
2
 Sometimes as in the case of India, due to various political compulsions like coalition & regional politics, 
the governments are forced to sacrifice the reforms process. The best example could be the halt of 
privatization process in India by the UPA government in 2002 due to pressures from its allies. Keeping 
away the Bills on Insurance, Banking and allowing Retail FDI reforms due to pressure from Left Front, a 
key ally supporting the UPA government from outside the parliament. Promises are often made by the 
incumbent governments in India to bring labour reforms. But these reforms are not even initiated by any 
government fearing political backlash.  There are numerous such examples in Indian context to show the 
backtracking from the promises made by the governments during the elections period to its public.  
 6 
real output, there are election-related expansions and reductions of the fiscal deficit by 
almost 0.7% of GDP. In an another study by Schuknecht (1999) finds for developing 
countries, that governments resort to expansionary fiscal policies to improve their 
chances of re-election. 
 
Moyo (1999) finds evidence of electoral cycles in public savings for a sample which 
includes both developed and developing countries. The study by Shi & Svensson (2000) 
examines fiscal policy electoral cycles for both developed and developing countries. 
They find evidence of political business cycles in government consumption and the fiscal 
deficit in a Rogoff-style model, with cycles of greater magnitude in developing countries. 
Testing the same, Block (2002) presents cross-country evidence of political business 
cycles for African countries. Using five monetary and fiscal instruments, his findings are 
consistent with the predictions of rational opportunistic political business cycle theory. In 
a regional study on India by Chaudhuri & Dasgupta (2005) finds that there is an increase 
in current expenditure and decline in developmental spending during the election years
3
. 
Contradicting these arguments, Khemani (2004) developed new model of ‗career 
concerns‘ in which she argues that during the election years, there is a significant 
improvement in public services and political manipulation of all kinds of polices do not 
find support. Only development spending (capital expenditure) tends to increase, while 
nondevelopment spending (current expenditure) reduces. Nevertheless, these models 
demonstrate the manipulation of incumbent governments to persuade voters before the 
election period and thereby generate electoral cycles.   
 
Figure 1: ‘Electoral Globalization Cycle‘ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taking into account the earlier discussions on socioeconomic implications of economic 
globalization process and electoral cycles, I believe that a government that is responsive 
to its voters in the country is more likely to slowdown the economic globalization process 
                     
3
 There are also studies which have found contradicting results. For example, see: Golden Poterba (1980); 
Alesina & Roubini (1992); Besley & Case (1995); Reid (1998). 
Economic  
Globalization process 
Years from scheduled election date 
 
(Scheduled election year = 0) 
   0     1     2     3     4    0   1     2     3     4    0  1     2     3     4    0 
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as the government nears scheduled elections. But the same responsive government once 
the takes over the office soon after the elections as an incumbent, is more likely to 
accelerate the economic globalization process. This brings us to our first two 
propositions: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Slowdown in economic globalization policies are associated with 
scheduled election years. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Slowdown in economic globalization policies is greater as 
incumbent government nears scheduled election year. 
 
Based on the first two hypotheses, I assume that there is an ‗electoral globalization cycle‘ 
which basically means slow down in economic globalization process is responsive to the 
propinquity to a schedule election year. Meaning, as incumbent government nears the 
schedule elections (election year being 0 in figure 1), economic globalization process 
keeps slowing down, while this is exactly opposite during the early years of incumbent 
government in office. 
 
Here it is very important to make a distinction between scheduled elections and midterm 
elections. In Indian context, scheduled elections are those which are constituted by 
elections commissions based on Constitution of India for every five years. Whereas, 
midterm elections are those that occur one, two, three or four years after the previous 
election (either scheduled or midterm), that is, before the completion of the five year term 
of the elected government in office. Therefore, this distinction between the two becomes 
even more important to globalization policy choices because the timing of midterm 
elections is usually sudden and unanticipated. So it is not reasonable to expect incumbent 
governments to slowdown globalization policies to influence election outcomes. This 
leads to our final proposition: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Slowdown in economic globalization policies is NOT associated 
with midterm elections because of the unanticipated and uncertain timing. 
 
Each of these hypotheses is examined in the empirical analysis which would follow this 
section. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 deals with research 
design with specific focus on measuring economic globalization process, creating 
instrumental electoral cycles for both scheduled and midterm elections, followed by data 
sources and identifying the empirical strategy to be employed. Section 4 presents 
discussion on the results derived from our empirical analysis. Final section concludes the 
study and highlights the scope for further research avenues.  
 
3. Research Design 
 
3.1. Measuring Economic Globalization: Why Dreher’s Index? 
 
There is a vast amount literature on estimating the effects of globalization on growth, 
development, poverty, inequality and so on. In all these studies globalization is measured 
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only partially with one or a few economic variables like the trade ratio, direct foreign 
investment, total capital flows, monopolization of exports, black market premiums and 
country specific globalization dummies etc. Such measures are generally known as 
openness of the economy. Subsequently more comprehensive measures of globalization 
were developed with the weighted average or principal components methods. The well 
known Sachs & Warner (1995) binary index of openness is based on the weighted 
averages of some economic variables. Others, while accepting economic variables are 
important to measure economic globalization, argued that brining them under one 
umbrella was the major task. The well known Lockwood & Redoano (2005) discrete 
index of economic globalization from 1980-2004, is based on a few such economic 
variables. Similarly, Kearney, Andersen & Herbertsson (2005) using trade and finance 
variables have also developed such indices for 62 countries starting from 2000, to 
determine the annual rakings of countries using Kearney index.
4
 In practice it is hard to 
maintain a distinction between openness which is proxied mostly with economic 
variables and economic globalization, which is much beyond just measuring trade 
openness. Thus the question to be addressed is how economic globalization should be 
measured.  
 
We do not take into consideration both the indices mentioned above for various obvious 
reasons. First, Lockwood & Redoano (2005) globalization index covers only trade and 
other economic variables ignoring some of the most important facets of economic 
globalization: tariffs, restrictions and quotas. Thus, this index without these important 
measures becomes just another simple proxy like trade openness variable. Second, with 
respect to Kearny index, as highlighted by Rao et al. (2008), their weighting scheme is 
somewhat arbitrary in that they do not adjust for the size of the country on the basis of its 
population. Third, it is not possible to use both Kearney, Andersen & Herbertsson (2005) 
and Lockwood & Redoano (2005) indices in time series regressions because of the 
absence of time series data. 
 
In light of all these observations, Axel Dreher (2006) is a welcome contribution because 
his comprehensive measures of globalization will help to decrease many disagreements 
on the measurement issue. Mainly Dreher‘s globalization index is formulated for 123 
countries from 1970 to 2005 and recently updated. His overall globalization index 
includes three sub indices from the economic globalization, social globalization and 
political globalization; see Section 2 in the study of Dreher (2006) for details
5
. This is 
beyond the scope of this study to use the comprehensive globalization index. Rather, our 
focus is on economic globalization.  
 
I select Dreher‘s economic globalization index simply because it overcomes all the three 
disadvantages highlighted above. The Dreher economic globalization index combines 
                     
4
 Using mainly economic variables are: Edwards (1998), Dollar & Kraay (2004). Rodrick (1997), Crafts 
(2000), Bordo & Meissner (2007) & Rincon (2005) found that globalization positively affects growth. 
Chanda (2001) used capital account openness as proxy for globalization to find that it does not help 
developing countries in growth, while Alesina et al. (1994) find the opposite. Using FDI as proxy for 
globalization, Zhang (2001), Campos & Kinoshit (2002), Alfaro (2003), Chowdary & Mavrotas (2006) and 
Hansen & Rand (2006) find that globalization has positive effects on growth.  
5
 These indices can be downloaded from http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ 
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many economic indicators which also includes ‗trade and investment restrictions‘ like: 
hidden import barriers, mean tariff rates, taxes on international trade (percent of current 
revenue) and capital account restrictions, which no other indices captures as 
comprehensively as Dreher‘s index. Of course, the other indicator in this index includes 
‗actual flows‘, which captures: income (percentage of GDP); volume of trade (percentage 
of GDP); FDI inflows and inflows stock (percentage of GDP) and Portfolio investments 
(percentage of GDP). The other advantage of Dreher‘s index is methodological as it uses 
widely available technique of the principal components method and Dreher index is most 
suitable for time series study as it dates back to 1970.  
 
3.1. i. ‘Modified’ Economic Globalization Index 
 
The Dreher‘s economic globalization index is measured on 0 – 100 scale, 0 meaning no 
or low economic globalization, while a score of 100 means full economic globalization. 
Sometimes, there can be problems while using this index as dependent variable. Since the 
economic globalization index coefficient is bounded between 1 and 100, using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS hereafter) regression might sometimes be problematic. This is 
because, often OLS assumes that the dependent variable to be unbounded. Thus, to 
counter this problem we follow Reuveny & Li (2003) method, which is a usual practice 
to transform the bounded variable into unbounded indicator. I transform the economic 
globalization index into unbounded measure by using the following formula: 
 
 
Unbounded Economic Globalization Index =  
 
    
I however, make use of this unbounded transformed economic globalization index to 
assess the robustness of the main results.  
 
3.2. Constructing Instrumental Electoral Cycles 
 
The need for constructing instrumental electoral cycle arises from the question whether 
timing of elections are endogenous to economic globalization process carried by the 
respective incumbent governments.  Theoretically speaking, this may not be true because 
in India, union elections are fixed on five year basis. The constitution of India allows the 
elections commission to conduct union elections once in five year period. However, over 
the period of time, especially from 1980s, India also witnessed quite a few midterm union 
elections. These occur due to various reasons which include drifting away the Member of 
Parliament from ruling alliance, political instability because the governments sometimes 
do not possess the required numbers to prove its majority in the parliaments, shifting of 
political alignments within the alliance group and so on. Infact in our sample from 1970 
to 2006, out of total 10 union elections, 5 happens to be midterm elections and rest are 
schedule elections. This means exactly 50% of the total union elections in our sample 
period are marked by midterm elections. The exact timing of these midterm union 
elections is sudden and unanticipated. Since these events are unexpected, it might not 
lead to slow down in economic globalization process, as the incumbent government 
Economic Globalization Index 
 
100 – Economic Globalization Index 
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would not have ample time to plan and react to these midterm elections. One possible 
solution to address this problem is to distinguish between the effects of scheduled union 
midterm elections on the outcome of interest – economic globalization process. To this 
end, I employ the technique of Khemani (2004) in constructing what is called as 
―instrumental electoral cycle‖ for both schedule and midterm elections.  
 
Figure 1: Schedule election cycle 
    
 
 
 
 
Years 
Note: SE= Schedule Elections 
 
The schedule election cycle is the one which follows a 5-year cycle and is renewed after 
every schedule election year, that is, it again begins with 4, 3, 2 and 1. The figure 1 best 
captures coding of this cycle.   
 
Figure 2: Midterm election cycle 
    
 
 
 
 
Years 
Note: SE= Schedule Elections; MT= Midterm Elections 
 
The midterm election cycle also follows a 5-year cycle, but it is also renewed after every 
midterm election. Many times, the scheduled elections coincide with election years in 
midterm election cycle. The midterm election years are treated to be 4, 3, 2, 1 year before 
a scheduled election year. The year after any midterm election is again coded as 4 years 
before a scheduled election followed by 3, 2 and 1. The timeline of the midterm election 
cycle is captured in figure 2.  
 
In our sample as highlighted earlier out of 10 election years, 5 are midterm elections 
which took place in 1980; 1984; 1991; 1998 and 1999. Amongst them, the high 
frequency political volatility period is a constant feature during post 1990s. Based on 
these discussions, we formulate the empirical model to estimate the direct effect of the 
electoral cycle on economic globalization polices of the incumbent government: 
 
 
 
 
……………………………… (1) 
 
SE    4    3    2    1  SE   4    3    2    1  SE   4   3     2    1   SE 
SE    4    3  MT  4   3    2    1   SE  4   MT 4    3    2   1   SE     
                               4                                    4 
EGt = 1  + Σ 2 SEC
Ŧ
t    + Σ 3 MTC
Ŧ
t    + 4 EGt-1  +  εt 
                                             
ф=1                            ф=1
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Where: t = time;   = Intercept for the equation;  = Regression Coefficients for variable 
―n‖; ε = error term for country at time ―t‖. The hypothesis variables presented here are: 
SEC = Schedule election cycle; MTC = Midterm election cycle and Ŧ = 1, 2, 3 & 4 for 
respective electoral cycles. This means for example: SEC
0
t is 1 if t is a scheduled election 
year in India; SEC
1
t is 1 if t is one year before a scheduled election year; SEC
2
t is 2 if t is 
two years before a scheduled election year; SEC
3
t is 3 if t is three years before a 
scheduled election year and SEC
4
t is 4 if t is three years before a scheduled election year 
in India.  
 
The results from above specification (1) may suffer from omitted variable bias due to 
absence of other control variables. Thus, the same equation is also estimated including 
some observable country characteristics CVt, including economic growth rate (GDP 
growth rate), economic development (proxied by log Percapita GDP), political 
constraints of the ruling government using political constraints index, official poverty 
rate; income inequality measured by Gini index and economic & political crisis dummy, 
which coded 1 if there is any economic and political crisis and 0 otherwise as control 
variables. The data for all these control variables comes from World development 
indicators (2006). This model allows to tests key hypothesis in this paper, which is: 
scheduled elections have a significant negative effect on economic globalization, but 
midterm elections do not. Thus, using these control variables, equation (1) would 
therefore be modified as follows: 
 
 
 
……………………………… (2) 
 
To capture the effects of distance from election years on globalization process, we 
developed ‗full election cycle year dummies‘. We formulate four dummy variables 
namely: 4-years before elections variables which take the value of 1 in the 4
th
 year before 
every schedule election year and 0 otherwise. The second dummy includes 3-years before 
elections variable which has the value 1 in the 3
rd
 year before every schedule election 
year and 0 otherwise. The third dummy variable is 2-years before elections variable 
include the value of 1 in the 2
nd
 year before every schedule election year and 0 otherwise. 
Finally, 1-year before elections variable takes the value of 1 in the 1
st
 year before every 
schedule election year and 0 otherwise. These variables allows to measure how the 
temporal distance from a scheduled election year affects economic globalization process 
vis-à-vis an election year. The model is specified as follows: 
 
 
 
 
……………………………… (3) 
 
Where, Dey1, 2, 3, 4…are the distance from election year dummies. This empirical 
analysis covers the period 1970 to 2006 for India. The time-series data may exhibit 
                                 4                                    4 
EGt = 1  + Σ 2 SEC
Ŧ
t    + Σ 3 MTC
Ŧ
t    + 4 CVt  +  t 
                                                 
ф=1                            ф=1
 
                    4                        4 
EGt = 1 + Σ β2 SEC
Ŧ
t  + Σ β3 MTC
Ŧ
t  + β4 CVt + β4 Dey1t + β4 Dey2t  + β4 Dey3t + β4 Dey4t + t 
                           ф=1                          ф=1
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Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation problems as they often tend to cause biased 
standard errors for coefficients, producing invalid statistical inferences. To deal with 
these problems, we estimated for all the models the Huber-White robust standard errors. 
These estimated standard errors are robust to both Heteroskedasticity and to a general 
type of serial correlation (Rogers, 1993 and Williams, 2000). Additionally, to confirm the 
results do not suffer from serial correlation, we also perform Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM Test.   
 
4. Empirical Results & Estimates 
 
4. 1. Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
 
The sample of years that we examine in total make up of 37 observations.  In Annexure 
1, we present summary statistics for this sample for all the variables that we employ in 
the regression analysis. The mean value for number of economic globalization index is 
22.00 per-years with a large standard deviation of roughly 9.07. Regarding GDP growth 
rate we can find that the median growth rate is 5.63%.  Moreover, the variance in GDP 
growth rates is fairly low, with a standard deviation of 3.01% and growth rates ranging 
from –5.24% to 9.86%. With respect to percapita GDP, the mean value is log 5.72 with a 
standard deviation of just log 0.35. The statistics for Poverty rate and Gini index are 
frightening. The mean value for the both is 39.55% and 32.86% respectively. These 
numbers are significantly higher by any international standards. While the maximum 
value for Poverty rate is 56.00% and 38.00% for Gini index, the minimum value is 
22.00% and 29.17% respectively.  
 
In Annexure 2 we present the information about the swing and the degree of swing in 
economic globalization index during schedule election years in India covering the sample 
period. We classified the swing, which is net change in the economic globalization index 
in schedule election year to previous year, under four categories. These include: decline; 
marginal increase; gradual increase and greater increase. These categories are arrived by 
using simple bifurcation of swing numbers which states that when the percentage change 
of index from current year (election year) to previous year is negative and or zero, then it 
is classified as decline. Similarly, when the percentage change in the index is in the range 
of 0.01 – 0.1, then it is called marginal increase phase. When the change in index ranges 
between 0.2 – 1.0, it is known to be gradual increase phase and when the index range 
from 1.1 and above, it is termed as greater increase. Using this simple methodology, we 
find in annexure 2 that out of seven schedule election years in the period of 1970 to 2006, 
three times, there as decline in the economic globalization index growth. Once there was 
marginal increase which was during 1996 amidst political crisis and uncertainty, which is 
decimal. Twice there was gradual increase in 1984 and 1989, which was the era of single 
party dominant governments. But only once, we could see a greater increase in index, 
which was in 2004. This tells us that there is certainly some impact of scheduled elections 
on the slowing down of globalization index in election years, though it is not as 
comprehensive as we would have expected.  
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4. 2. Regression Estimates 
 
The results of regression estimates in assessing the impact of schedule and midterm 
electoral cycle on economic globalization process in India are presented in table 1 and 2 
(models 1 to 7). Addressing the problems of serial correlation and multicollinearity, 
specific tests are conducted and the results are displayed at the end of the each model in 
table 1 and 2. Further, the results of robustness check and sensitivity analysis are 
presented in annexures 4; 5 and 6. We also control for the problem of Heteroskedasticity 
using White Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance.  
 
The regression results confirm the hypothesis offered on electoral cycles in economic 
globalization in the Indian context. Specifically, the results from the both the equations (1 
& 2) show that schedule elections have a significant negative effect on the economic 
globalization process. Concentrating on results of equation 1 indicates the direct 
relationship between economic globalization process and electoral cycle. The coefficients 
reported in model 1 (table 1) indicate that the presence of schedule election year is 
leading to decline in economic globalization index by 0.28% with 10% statistical 
significance. Several studies include a lagged dependent variable to control for 
autocorrelation. A lagged dependent variable is also meant to control for the spill-over 
effects (Neumayer, 2005). There are two reasons for the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable specifically in this model. First, a methodological reason, that is to control for 
autocorrelation, endogenity, and omitted variables (Beck & Katz, 1995). Second, a 
theoretical reason, that holds that governments tend to use past decisions as a baseline for 
their present decisions.  
 
Table 1: Elections & Economic Globalization equation function 
 
Dependent variable: Dreher‘s Economic Globalization Index 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
 
Constant 
-0.18 
(0.63) 
-1.06 + 
(0.76) 
-0.36  
(0.86) 
Schedule Election year 
-0.28 *** 
(0.15) 
------ -0.28 *** 
(0.16) 
Mid-term Election years 
------ 0.09 
(0.15) 
0.07 
(0.15) 
Economic Globalization (t-1) 
1.08 * 
(0.03) 
1.08 * 
(0.02) 
1.07 * 
(0.03) 
 
R-squared 0.986029 0.984817 0.986110 
Adjusted R-squared 0.985183 0.983897 0.984808 
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.198445 2.151341 2.228900 
Log likelihood -53.24673 -54.74492 -53.14216 
F-statistic 1164.544 1070.222 757.2849 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 
F-statistic 0.719393 0.359689 0.868890 
Probability. F 0.4026 0.5529 0.3585 
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Total number of Observations 37 37 37 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
The results of lagged dependent variable show 1% significant and positive relationship. 
This suggests that governments tend to use past decisions as a baseline for their present 
decisions. Using lagged dependent variables, we were also able to counter the problem of 
auto correlation
6
. In model 2, we replaced schedule elections cycle with the midterm 
election cycle. We found that it is neither negative nor significant, suggesting that 
midterm elections do not have any impact on slowing down of economic globalization 
process because of the uncertainty of occurrence associated with such elections. In model 
3, we introduced both schedule and midterm election cycles and found that schedule 
election cycle having 10% significant and negatively associated with economic 
globalization process, while once again, we could not find any such relationship with 
midterm electoral cycle.  
 
In all the three models (in table 1), we use lagged dependent variable, which help 
improve Durbin-Watson (DW hereafter) statistic and counter autocorrelation problem. To 
confirm the non existence of serial correlation problem, we also perform Breusch-
Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test (results shown at the end of table 1). We found that 
the all the models are free from the problem of serial correlation. But these results might 
suffer from omitted variable bias. Also, these results should be validated by including 
some of the important socioeconomic variables which formulate key determinants of 
economic globalization process.  A step in this direction is the results captured in model 4 
to 7 in table 2. Another prominent feature of this model is that we also capture the full 
cycle of schedule elections using distance from election year dummies highlighted in 
equation 3.  
 
Table 2: Elections & Economic Globalization equation function 
 
Dependent variable: Dreher‘s Economic Globalization Index 
 
Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
 
 
Constant 
-248.52 * 
(19.23) 
-246.69 * 
(24.41) 
-255.32 * 
(26.29) 
-250.46 * 
(17.52) 
Schedule Election year 
-0.49 ** 
(0.21) 
------ ------ -0.69 * 
(0.22) 
Mid-term Election years 
------ -0.24 
(0.25) 
------ ------ 
1 year before Elections 
------ ------ 0.42 
(0.71) 
0.30 
(0.65) 
2 years before Elections 
------ ------ 0.97 *** 
(0.59) 
1.59 * 
(0.52) 
                     
6
 We first ran these results without lagged dependent variables. We obtained DW stat of 0.80 value. After 
using the lagged dependent variable, we the DW stat significantly improved.  
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3 years before Elections 
------ ------ 0.69 + 
(0.48) 
0.05 
(0.54) 
4 years before Elections 
------ ------ 0.09 
(1.24) 
-0.62 
(0.89) 
Log (Economic Development) 
41.38 * 
(3.05) 
41.28 * 
(3.72) 
42.34 * 
(4.19) 
41.30 * 
(2.91) 
GDP Growth rate 
-0.27 * 
(0.08) 
-0.26 * 
(0.09) 
-0.28 * 
(0.09) 
-0.29 * 
(0.08) 
Political Constraints Index 
-4.93 + 
(3.38) 
-6.16 + 
(4.12) 
-5.12 
(3.70) 
-4.20 
(3.26) 
Poverty Rates 
0.63 * 
(0.08) 
0.61 * 
(0.11) 
0.65 * 
(0.11) 
0.64 * 
(0.08) 
Gini Inequality  
0.41 * 
(0.14) 
0.39 ** 
(0.14) 
0.39 ** 
(0.15) 
0.47 * 
(0.13) 
Economic & Political Crisis 
-1.35 *** 
(0.82) 
-0.80 
(0.79) 
-0.81 
(0.81) 
-1.60 ** 
(0.76) 
 
R-squared 0.982914 0.980214 0.980935 0.986617 
Adjusted R-squared 0.978790 0.975438 0.973602 0.980728 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.823487 1.524448 1.584861 2.099284 
Log likelihood -58.28612 -61.00085 -60.31421 -53.76759 
F-statistic 238.3342 205.2402 133.7747 167.5486 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic 0.187697 1.771908 1.130441 0.245338 
Probability. F 0.6682 0.1939 0.2978 0.6249 
Total number of Observations 37 37 37 37 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
The coefficients of schedule elections reported in model 4 of table 2 indicate that 
schedule election years are strongly associated with decline in economic globalization 
process. We find that for every single election year, the economic globalization index is 
reduced by 0.49%. Infact adding control variables lifted the statistical significance level 
of this variable to 5%. These results remain consistent across the board. In the model 5, 
we replace schedule elections with midterm electoral cycle. We find that though it has 
negative sign, it remains statistically insignificant, suggesting that midterm elections 
necessarily need not result in slow down of economic globalization process. We present 
full election cycle using distance from election year dummies in model 6 (see table 2). 
The results show some interesting findings. We find that all the variables, 4, 3, 2, and 1 
year distance from election year is positive. But the coefficient values of these variables 
show some interesting trends. I find that economic globalization process would increase 
by just 0.09% during the first year of incumbent government in office. This increase is 
0.69% during the second year of incumbent government in office. While, economic 
globalization process increase by more than 0.97% in the third year of incumbent 
government in office, but then it decreases by 0.45% in the fourth year in office, 
registering an insignificant increase in economic globalization index of 0.42% in the year 
before a scheduled election. This goes down even further in the election year resulting in 
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negative effect on economic globalization process. The coefficients plotted in graph 1 
(see annexures) clearly depict a ‗cyclical movement‘ in carrying out the economic 
globalization process by the incumbent governments. The graph shows a perfect inverted 
U-shaped kind of relationship between schedule elections and economic globalization 
process. We also estimated this equation by including schedule election variable with 
these full electoral cycle dummies (see model 7; table 2). We found almost similar such 
relationship between schedule elections and economic globalization process. The 
coefficients of this model are also captured in graph 2 (see annexures). These results 
confirm all the three hypothesis, H1; H2 & H3. 
 
Within the control variables, we find that improvement in economic development has a 
greater positive influence on economic globalization process. Holding at its mean value, 
increase in economic development by its highest value (log 6.45) would increase 
economic globalization index by 41.38%. Strangely, we find opposite results with respect 
to economic growth. But, the coeffient value of the later is much lesser than that of 
former. With respect of socioeconomic variables, we find both poverty rate and income 
inequality (Gini) index are positively associated with economic globalization process. A 
1% increase in both, increases economic globalization index by 0.61% and 0.41% 
respectively. The other political variables include, political constraints index, which is 
negatively associated with economic globalization process. Though this relationship is 
weak at 15% significance, increase in this variable lowers economic globalization index 
by 4.93%. While, for every economic and political crisis there is a corresponding decline 
in economic globalization index by 1.35%. Despite inclusion of these key control 
variables, our main hypothesis variables results do not alter.  We also report correlation 
matrix in annexure 3. One can observe that there is no significant multicollinearity 
problem, though in couple of cases (poverty, inequality & economic development) the 
correlation is quite high. Also, the DW stat show fairly good results, but to ensure that the 
model do not suffer from serial correlation problem, we perform Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM Test (results shown at the end of the table 2). The results of the test 
confirm the absence of serial correlation problem.  
 
4.3 Robustness Check 
 
We wanted to breakdown the sample into two periods, pre and post reforms period
7
 to 
reconfirm these results. However, we could not do so because we were handicapped 
because the total sample period was very short and we could not breakdown into two 
periods as the results would be biased and not longer be valid. Despite this, we ran 
several tests of sensitivity. First, we ran the results by introducing schedule election year 
along with each of the full election cycle variables separately. The results are captured in 
annexure 4. The results show that schedule election variable in all models from 8 to 11 
remains negatively significant. Despite introducing each full election cycle dummy 
variables separately, the results of schedule election year remain intact. Despite 
introducing election variables separately, we could still trace an inverted U-shaped curve 
on the coefficients of these variables. The results are also free from serial correlation 
                     
7
 The official economic reforms program in India was started in 1991 with the help of World Bank‘s 
Structural Adjustment Program.  
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problem as indicated by Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test. Second, in the 
next two models (12 & 13) captured in annexure 5, we introduced number of strikes and 
lockouts variable. This captures the anti-globalization protests. We witness that the main 
hypothesis variables results to be perfectly stable. Even in this case, we can see an 
inverted U-shaped curve on the coefficients of elections variables.  
 
Third and the final robustness check include performing sensitivity analysis, this time by 
changing the dependent variable. We replace Axel Dreher‘s economic globalization 
index with our own ‗modified economic globalization index‘. The results are captured in 
annexure 6. We find that despite the change in dependent variable, the schedule election 
year variable has 5% significant negative effect on economic globalization process. 
While, consistent with our earlier findings, we could not find any statistical significant 
impact of midterm elections on economic globalization. It is also worth noting in models 
16 and 17 (annexure 6) that full election cycle variables depict the trend of inverted U-
shaped relationship with economic globalization process. Despite performing several 
robustness checks, we could gather three important findings. These include: one, 
schedule elections year significantly reduces economic globalization process. Two, there 
is no impact of what so ever of midterm elections on economic globalization process and 
finally, there is a clear U-shaped relationship between full election cycle and economic 
globalization process, suggesting that as incumbent government nears the schedule 
elections, economic globalization process keeps slowing down, while this is exactly 
opposite during the early years of incumbent government in office. 
 
5. Conclusion & Summary 
 
Literature on political competition demonstrates how incumbent politicians might 
manipulate economic policies to persuade voters before an election, and thereby generate 
political budget cycles (Nordhuas, 1975; Lindbeck, 1976; Rogoff & Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 
1990; Khemani 2004 and Chaudhuri & Dasgupta, 2005). There are similar such studies 
with specific reference to India (Karnik, 1990; Sen & Vaidya, 1996; Khemani, 2004 and 
Chaudhuri & Dasgupta, 2005) but are generally related to fiscal policies. We extend this 
to the economic globalization polices adopted by the central governments in India. We 
formulate ‗electoral globalization cycle‘ based on the premise that globalization process 
leads to short run losses but benefit the economy in long run. Because the benefits of the 
economic globalization process tends to be isolated and costs associated with it are 
strenuous in short run, those sections of the society who are worst hit by these policies 
would like to replace the incumbent government with those who are more likely to adapt 
policies which do not hurt the people. This often forces the incumbent government to 
slowdown the economic globalization process as and when they near the scheduled 
election period. Based on this theory, we offered and tested three related hypotheses on 
electoral cycle related to economic globalization process.  
 
Using time series data on elections and Axel Dreher‘s economic globalization index, it 
demonstrated that economic globalization process responds to the timing of union 
elections in India. While there was a strong electoral cycle in economic globalization 
process, which experienced a marked decline in election years, the impact of midterm 
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elections is insignificant. This is perhaps due to its timing which is uncertain and 
unanticipated which gives no scope of the incumbent governments to slow down the 
economic globalization process. The results portrayed in the paper are strongly valid as 
we have nullified the problems of serial correlation and multicollinearity. We also 
addressed the issue of bounded dependent variable and converted the same into unbound 
variable. The results do not change using this unbounded economic globalization index. 
Thus, an incumbent‘s varying degree of concern for slowing down the globalization 
process for its short term political gains and fear against loosing the elections increases as 
the union elections draw nearer - does seem to be a plausible hypothesis, and is well 
supported by the results in this paper. This is best exemplified by the estimated 
instrumental electoral cycle for economic globalization process wherein both the 
globalization process tend to increase during the earlier years of an incumbent‘s tenure in 
office, and decline in as scheduled elections draws near. Further, the statistically 
insignificant effect of midterm elections on the economic globalization process also 
provides evidence in favor of the hypotheses offered in this study. 
 
Implications of the results & where do we go from here? 
 
The results in this paper highlight three important points. First, these results show that 
electoral cycles are not necessarily confined to fiscal and monetary policies alone. Rather, 
it can affect the most important policies like economic globalization process, which 
inturn drives various policies of the governments (like fiscal, monetary, public sector 
etc). Second, these results also suggest that elections can indeed act as a disciplining 
device for incumbent governments in the hands of the losers in the short run to influence 
the fate of the incumbent governments to halt the neoliberal policies. Finally, the effect of 
political manipulation of economic globalization policies by the incumbent governments 
shows how politicians are only concerned to maximize their short run political gains at 
the expense of minimizing the long run economic benefits generated from higher levels 
of economic globalization process. Taking these results into consideration, our next 
interesting step would be to probe whether similar such results can be replicated using 
time series cross sectional analysis for other democratic countries in the world.  
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Annexures 
 
 
Annexure 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Economic 
Globalization 
GDP  
growth rate  
Log  
(Percapita GDP) 
Political 
Constraints 
Poverty 
rate 
Gini 
Index 
Schedule 
Elections 
 Mean  22.00  5.18  5.72  0.44  39.55  32.86  2.14 
 Median  15.94  5.63  5.68  0.42  39.00  31.88  2.00 
 Maximum  44.00  9.86  6.45  0.58  56.00  38.00  4.00 
 Minimum  14.60 -5.24  5.29  0.29  22.00  29.17  1.00 
 Standard Deviation  9.07  3.01  0.35  0.08  10.45  2.68  1.18 
 Probability  0.04  0.00  0.23  0.45  0.28  0.08  0.14 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  2960.65  326.89  4.38  0.21  3928.47  259.58  50.32 
 Observations  37  37  37  37  37  37  37 
 
 
 
Mid-term 
elections 
Economic & 
Political Crisis 
1 year before 
elections 
2 years before 
elections 
3 years before 
elections 
4 years before 
elections 
 Mean  2.51  0.13  0.16  0.14  0.11  0.11 
 Median  3.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 Maximum  4.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
 Minimum  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 Standard Deviation  1.17  0.35  0.37  0.35  0.32  0.32 
 Probability  0.20  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  49.24  4.32  5.03  4.32  3.57  3.57 
 Observations  37  37  37  37  37  37 
 
 
 
 
Annexure 2: Economic Globalization during Election years 
 
Sl. No. 
 
Schedule 
Election year 
 
Swing in Economic 
Globalization Index 
 
Net change in Index {t - (t-1)} 
 
1 1970 Decline 0 
2 1977 Decline -0.1 
3 1980 Decline -0.1 
4 1984 Gradual Increase +0.21 
5 1989 Gradual Increase +0.71 
6 1996 Marginal Increase +0.05 
7 2004 Greater Increase +1.6 
Note: t = current years; Decline = negative change in index in t from t-1; Marginal increase in change in 
index range between 0.01 – 0.1; Gradual increase in change in index range between 0.2 – 1.0; Greater 
increase in change in index range from 1.1 and above. 
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Annexure 3: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
GDP 
growth rate 
Log  
(Percapita GDP) 
Political 
constraints 
Poverty 
rate 
Gini 
Inequality 
Schedule 
Elections  
Mid-
Elections 
Economic Globalization        
GDP growth rate  1.00       
Log (Percapita GDP)  0.46  1.00      
Political constraints  0.05  0.14  1.00     
Poverty rate -0.43 -0.86 -0.18  1.00    
Gini Inequality  0.26  0.80  0.01 -0.74  1.00   
Schedule Elections -0.10 -0.07  0.09  0.08  0.06  1.00  
Mid-elections  0.02  0.15 -0.18 -0.17  0.15 -0.03  1.00 
Socioeconomic crisis -0.04 -0.15 -0.23  0.09 -0.37 -0.31  0.09 
1 year before elections  0.22 -0.06  0.02  0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.32 
2 years before elections  0.07 -0.03  0.03  0.00 -0.10  0.29 -0.17 
3 years before elections  0.01  0.02 -0.06 -0.07  0.06 -0.18  0.22 
4 years before elections  0.02 -0.00  0.24 -0.00  0.09 -0.11  0.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Socioeconomic 
crisis 
1 year before 
elections 
2 years before 
elections 
3 years before 
elections 
4 years before 
elections 
Socioeconomic crisis  1.00     
1 year before elections  0.04  1.00    
2 years before elections  0.07 -0.17 1.00   
3 years before elections -0.13 -0.15 -0.13 1.00  
4 years before elections -0.13 -0.15 -0.13 -0.12  1.00 
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Annexure 4: Robustness check – 1: Elections & Economic Globalization equation function 
 
Dependent variable: Dreher‘s Economic Globalization Index 
 
Variables Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
 
 
Constant 
-248.43 * 
(19.76) 
-251.23 * 
(17.73) 
-248.63 * 
(20.65) 
-247.35 * 
(17.19) 
Schedule Election year 
-0.49 ** 
(0.21) 
-0.66 * 
(0.20) 
-0.49 ** 
(0.23) 
-0.54 ** 
(0.20) 
1 year before Elections 
0.10 
(0.65) 
------ ------ ------ 
2 years before Elections 
------ 1.56 * 
(0.50) 
------ ------ 
3 years before Elections 
------ ------ 0.02 
(0.47) 
------ 
4 years before Elections 
------ ------ ------ -0.87 
(0.86) 
Log (Economic Development) 
41.39 * 
(3.08) 
41.60 * 
(2.91) 
41.40 * 
(3.26) 
40.88 * 
(2.86) 
GDP Growth rate 
-0.27 * 
(0.08) 
-0.29 * 
(0.07) 
-0.27 * 
(0.08) 
-0.26 * 
(0.09) 
Political Constraints Index 
-4.97  
(3.55) 
-4.91 + 
(3.22) 
-4.92 
(3.50) 
-3.84 
(3.03) 
Poverty Rates 
0.63 * 
(0.09) 
0.64 * 
(0.08) 
0.63 * 
(0.09) 
0.63 * 
(0.07) 
Gini Inequality Index 
0.41 ** 
(0.15) 
0.45 * 
(0.13) 
0.41 * 
(0.14) 
0.46 * 
(0.14) 
Economic & Political Crisis 
-1.36 + 
(0.86) 
-1.56 ** 
(0.69) 
-1.34 + 
(0.87) 
-1.38 *** 
(0.83) 
 
R-squared 0.982929 0.985946 0.982915 0.983681 
Adjusted R-squared 0.978052 0.981930 0.978033 0.979018 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.820801 2.166064 1.824140 1.865997 
Log likelihood -58.27005 -54.67315 -58.28578 -57.43698 
F-statistic 201.5293 245.5318 201.3551 210.9731 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic 0.197479 0.450628 0.193503 0.081264 
Probability. F 0.6603 0.5077 0.6635 0.7778 
Total number of Observations 37 37 37 37 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Annexure 5: Robustness check – 2: Elections & Economic Globalization equation function 
 
Dependent variable: Dreher‘s Economic Globalization Index 
 
Variables Model 12 Model 13 
 
 
Constant 
-244.66 * 
(20.31) 
-252.81 * 
(27.72) 
Schedule Election year 
-0.47 ** 
(0.23) 
------ 
1 year before Elections 
------ 0.33 
(0.72) 
2 years before Elections 
------ 0.88 + 
(0.57) 
3 years before Elections 
------ 0.62 
(0.52) 
4 years before Elections 
------ 0.16 
(1.36) 
Log (Economic Development) 
40.73 * 
(3.24) 
41.89 * 
(4.36) 
GDP Growth rate 
-0.27 * 
(0.08) 
-0.28 * 
(0.09) 
Political Constraints Index 
-4.81 
(3.50) 
-4.96 
(3.54) 
Poverty Rates 
0.64 * 
(0.09) 
0.65 * 
(0.12) 
Gini Inequality Index 
0.41 * 
(0.14) 
0.39 ** 
(0.15) 
Economic & Political Crisis 
-1.46 *** 
(0.86) 
-0.88 
(0.95) 
Number of Strikes & Lockouts 
-0.0004 
(0.00) 
-0.0002 
(0.00) 
 
R-squared 0.983070 0.980956 
Adjusted R-squared 0.978233 0.972577 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.860615 1.596432 
Log likelihood -58.11641 -60.29358 
F-statistic 203.2392 117.0690 
Total number of Observations 37 37 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Annexure 6: Sensitivity Analysis - Elections & Economic Globalization equation function 
 
Dependent variable: Modified Economic Globalization Index 
 
Variables Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 
 
 
Constant 
-5.22 * 
(0.57) 
-5.18 * 
(0.71) 
-5.29 * 
(0.71) 
-5.16 * 
(0.48) 
Schedule Election year 
-0.01 ** 
(0.00) 
------ ------ -0.02 ** 
(0.01) 
Mid-term Election years 
------ -0.01  
(0.01) 
------ ------ 
1 year before Elections 
------ ------ 0.001 
(0.02) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
2 years before Elections 
------ ------ 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.03 ** 
(0.01) 
3 years before Elections 
------ ------ 0.005 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
4 years before Elections 
------ ------ -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
Log (Economic Development) 
0.84 * 
(0.09) 
0.83 * 
(0.11) 
0.84 * 
(0.12) 
0.82 * 
(0.08) 
GDP Growth rate 
-0.004 ** 
(0.00) 
-0.004 *** 
(0.00) 
-0.004 + 
(0.00) 
-0.004 ** 
(0.00) 
Political Constraints Index 
-0.16 *** 
(0.09) 
-0.19 **** 
(0.10) 
-0.16 *** 
(0.10) 
-0.14 + 
(0.09) 
Poverty Rates 
0.01 * 
(0.00) 
0.01 * 
(0.00) 
0.01 * 
(0.00) 
0.01 * 
(0.00) 
Gini Inequality Index 
0.01 ** 
(0.00) 
0.01 ** 
(0.00) 
0.01 *** 
(0.00) 
0.01 ** 
(0.00) 
Economic & Political Crisis 
-0.03 *** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.03 ** 
(0.02) 
 
R-squared 0.966560 0.961491 0.961514 0.971873 
Adjusted R-squared 0.958489 0.952195 0.946712 0.959497 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.414022 1.178193 1.172264 1.497718 
Log likelihood 75.36145 72.75005 72.76130 78.56216 
F-statistic 119.7479 103.4381 64.95737 78.52964 
Total number of Observations 37 37 37 37 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Graph 1 for Model 6 
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Graph 2 for Model 7 
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